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BEGGING AND THE PUBLIC FORUM
DOCTRINE IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Begging, in its various forms, from the passive extension of a paper
cup, to more aggressive tactics, has become an inseparable component
of the modern urban landscape.' Each beggar represents a unique
path into poverty, but they all seek alms for the same reason, survival. 2
Although impossible to estimate with certainty, a general consensus
exists that the homeless population has increased in recent times.3
Many urban residents' and commuters' daily contact with beggars
reinforces these estimates. 4 As homelessness has apparently reached
critical mass, so has the public's frustration with begging.' Panhandlers
are viewed as another manifestation of the deterioration afflicting
American cities, 6
 and beggars consequently experience backlash from
the mainstream, as attempts to salvage the inner cities have intensified.?
Thus, beggars on the fringes of society ironically now find themselves
amidst the central paradox of our day, the conflict between individual
liberty and the power of the majority. 8
Recently, beggars have begun to use the First Amendment to
challenge the, government's attempts to prohibit begging.' In 1990, in
I See Tony Perry, No Alms for the Panhasslers,'1..A. Times, Jan. 12, 1993, at A3 ("[e]ven the
police grudgingly accept panhandling as part of the cityscape").
2 See Perry, supra note 1, at A3. But see Dan Williams, Phony Homeless People Panhandle for
Money (CNN News television broadcast, Jan. 14, 1993) (police allege scam artists pose as homeless
beggars to get money from public).
See LAURA D. WAXMAN, THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT
ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1991, at 25 (1991).
4
 See Paul G. Chevigny, Begging and the First Amendment: Young v. New York City Transit
Authority, 57 BROOK. L. Rev. 525, 528 (1991); Sonya Rose, Street View: Daily Walks Sharpen Sense
of Disparity, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1992, at 8.
5 See WAXMAN, supra note 3, at 59-62; Perry, supra note 1, at A3; J.L.. 	 Pimsleur, Police
Commission OKs Anti-Panhandling Rules, S.F. CONON., Jan. 7, 1993, at A20 (voters approve
anti-begging ordinance claiming that beggars are "trashing" the city).
6 See John Leo, Fighting For Our Public Spaces, U.S. NEWS & WORN) REP., Feb. 3, 1992, at 18
[hereinafter Fighting]; John Leo, Rightsmcmgering and Urban Decay, U.S. News & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 14, 1992, at 23 [hereinafter Rightsmongering]; James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken
Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 34.
7
 Williams, supra note 2 (notes crackdown to get beggars air the streets for the public's sake).
B See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 1 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978); see also Williams,
supra note 2 (classic battle between safety of masses and rights of few),
• See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
984 (1990); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Blair
v. Shanahan, 775 E Supp. 1315, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see aiso jordana Hart, Street Begging Focus
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Young v. New York City Transit Authority, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an ordinance banning begging
in the New York subway system." In 1991, however, in Blair v. Shana-
han, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California declined to follow Young and held a California prohibition
on begging unconstitutional." One year later, in Loper v. New York City
Police Department, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York also sidestepped Youngand invalidated a New York
ordinance banning begging on the city streets." Thus, beggars' First
Amendment challenges have yielded inconsistent results."
A 1992 United States Supreme Court decision, International Society
of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee ("ISKCON') may foreshadow the ap-
proach courts will take to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent treat-
ment of begging." In ISKCON, the Court struck down a ban on the
distribution of literature while upholding a ban on charitable solicita-
tion in New York area airports.' 5
 Despite generating five separate opin-
ions, all the Justices grounded their reasoning' in the Public Forum
doctrine, linking the degree of scrutiny accorded speech restrictions
to a classification of its context."
This Note argues that begging generally should be protected be-
cause it constitutes "speech" within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment, and regulations banning begging should be analyzed under the
Public Forum doctrine analysis." Section I discusses First Amendment
jurisprudence, focusing on three aspects: what is meant by "speech;"
the degree of scrutiny to which regulations are subjected; and the
values underlying the First Amendment." Section II traces the treat-
ment of charitable solicitation in the United States Supreme Court
under the First Amendment." Section III explores the history of beg-
of Lawsuit; ACLU Challenges Cambridge Arrests, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1993, at 13; GLUM
Challenges Arrests for Begging, THE DOCKET, Sept. 1992, at 1.
10 903 F.2d at 164.
11 775 F. Supp. at 1323, 1329.
12 802 F. a pp at 1036, 1048.
13 See Anthonyf. Rose, Note, The Beggar's Free Speech Claim, 65 IND. L. REV. 191, 193 (1989).
14 See 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-06 (1992) [hereinafter ISKCON I]; Lee v. International Soc'y of
Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 271 0 (1992) [hereinafter ISKCON 11]; International Soc'y
of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct 2711, 2712, 2716, 2724 (1992) [hereinafter ISKCON
III]. This note will refer to the opinions collectively as "ISKCON."
'5 ISKCON II, 112 S. Ct. at 2710; ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2709.
16 See ISKCON L 112 S. Ct. at 2705-06; ISKCON 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2710; ISKCON III, 112 S.
Ct. at 2712 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2724 (Souter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17 See infra notes 399-411 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 22-109 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 110-256 and accompanying text.
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gars' First Amendment challenges. 2° Finally, Section IV explores beg-
ging's role in society and argues that it constitutes protected expression
under the First Amendment. The section concludes that begging re-
strictions should be reviewed under the Public Forum doctrine. 21
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
First Amendment jurisprudence represents uneven terrain, battle-
scarred by years of philosophical warfare. 22 Although the First Amend-
ment occupies a preferred position in constitutional law, reflecting its
fundamental role in our society, the Supreme Court has held that the
guarantee of free expression is not absolute." Demarcating the scope
of expressive freedom raises three initial concerns: the definition of
"speech," the degree of scrutiny under which regulations are evaluated,
and the fundamental values that guide First Amendment analysis. 24
A. Speech v. Conduct Distinction
As a threshold issue, the courts examine whether an activity con-
stitutes "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment. 25 The
Supreme Court has not limited the First Amendment to the spoken or
written word, but has extended the Amendment's sweep to include
conduct that conveys a message. 26 The protection of expressive conduct
reflects the notion that the desire to promote ideas, not simply words,
20 See infra notes 257-377 and accompanying text
21 See infra notes 378-407 and accompanying text
22 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982).
There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to
devise a coherent theory of free expression. These efforts have been characterized by a "pattern
of aborted doctrines, shifting rationales, and frequent changes of position by individual Justices,"
Id.; see also THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OP FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970). The First
Amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent pare "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech ...."
25 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110,
115 (1943); Rose, supra note 13, at 196.
2'1 See Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 Cotuad. L.
REv. 467, 468 (1984).
25 Magid, supra note 24, at 468.
26 Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA
L. REV. 29, 30 (1973); Aaron Johnson, Note, The Second Circuit Refuses to Extend Beggars a Helping
Hand: Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 69 Want U. L.Q. 969, 971 (1991); Sally A. Specht,
Comment, The Wavering, Unpredictable Line Between "Speech" and Conduct: The Fate of Expressive
Conduct After Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 40 WASH, U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 173, 173
(1991); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (burning American flag conveys
message); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (taping peace symbol on American
flag is expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep, Comtnunity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969) (wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam War conveys message); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (sit-in at segregated library is expressive conduct).
1124	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 34:1121
underpins the First Amendment. 27
 Protecting conduct, therefore, ex-
pands the potential range of messages and speakers. 28
The Supreme Court has struggled to distinguish between pro-
tected expression and ordinary conduct. 28
 Commentators have noted
that, unless telepathic, all speech necessarily involves conduct." Con-
versely, every act contains within it, a "kernel of expression."' Despite
this tangled web of speech and conduct, the Supreme Court has made
clear that First Amendment protection does not extend to an unlim-
ited variety of acts?' Commentators observe that the courts attempt to
separate the expressive from the non-expressive elements of an act and
then determine which aspect predominates." This approach, however,
becomes exceedingly difficult when the Court is faced with ambiguous
conduct, that is, acts that may typically, but not always, be done for
noncommunicative reasons."
In 1974, in Spence v. Washington, the Supreme Court articulated
a two-factor test for distinguishing expressive from ordinary conduct"
The case involved the flag desecration conviction of a student who
hung an American flag adorned with a peace symbol from his window
to protest the U.S. invasion of Cambodia." The Court held that, in
order to be expressive conduct, first, the speaker must intend the
conduct to convey a particularized message. 37
 Second, the Court re-
quired a strong likelihood that the audience could discern the in-
tended message. 38
 Applying this standard, the Court concluded that
27 Nimmer, supra note 26, at 33-39; see also Johnson, supra note 26, at 970-71.
28 See Magid, supra note 24, at 471. Magid notes that protecting conduct avoids unduly
henefitting those with high verbal abilities at the expense of those with other skills. Id. She also
notes that "action ... may he the only way [for small or unpopular groups] to effectively convey
[their] views" to a wide audience. Id. Moreover, Magid emphasizes that protecting conduct
expands the range of messages to a) those difficult to express in words and b) those in which
the medium of conduct is the message. Id. (emphasis in the original).
29 See Johnson, supra note 26, at 971-72; Magid, supra note 24, at 467.
3°Nimmer, supra note 26, at 33; Johnson, supra note 26, at 971.
31
 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989); see also Nimmer, supra note 26, at 36;
Johnson, supra note 26, at 971.
32
 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Johnson, supra note 26, at 971; Magid,
supra note 24, at 471; Specht, supra note 26, at 178.
33 See John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975); Magid, supra note 24, at 475.
34 See Magid, supra note 24, at 495 (sleeping); Chevigny, supra note 4, at 525.
35 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974); see also Johnson, supra note 26, at 973; Stephanie M. Kaufman,
Note, The Speech/Conduct Distinction and First Amendment Protection of Begging in Subways, 79
GEO. WASH. L.J. 1803, 1820; Specht, supra note 26, at 179.
3E'
	 418 U.S. at 406-07.
37 See id. at 410-11; see also Johnson, supra note 26, at 973; Kaufman, supra note 35, at 1820;
Specht, supra note 26, at 179.
38
 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11; see also Johnson, supra note 26, at 973; Kaufman, supra note
35, at 1820; Specht, supra note 26, at 179.
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the student's actions intended a clearly discernible message that was
protected by the First Amendment." Therefore, the Court invalidated
the student's conviction.'"
Commentators have criticized the reliance on separating expres-
sion from ordinary conduct as a First Amendment technique. 41 Some
argue that the distinctions are conclusory and represent a hidden
balancing of indeterminate factors. 42 Others have criticized the Spence
standard as too narrow, overlooking a powerful range of expression
that defies being distilled into words. 43 Nevertheless, a court begins its
First Amendment analysis by determining if a given activity constitutes
speech, and must wrestle with distinguishing expressive from ordinary
conduct under the Spence standard.'"
B. Degree of Scrutiny
1. Two-Track Analysis
Once an activity is found to be protectable speech, a court must
determine the level of scrutiny to apply to restrictions on that activity.*
The United States Supreme Court has developed a bifurcated ap-
proach to judicial scrutiny, the two-track analysis, that hinges on the
governmental purpose behind the restriction."" "Content-based" re-
strictions directly aim at suppressing speech, whereas "content-neutral"
regulations incidentally affect speech while targeting other activity. 47
A content-based restriction is on track one and faces the most
"exacting scrutiny." 48
 A court first examines whether the activity being
89 Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Clievigny, supra note 4, at 545; Kaufman, supra note 35, at 1824; Harry Kalven,
Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v, Louisiana, 1965 SUP. Or. REV. I, 12 (1965); Helen
Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104
HARI/. L. lbw. 896, 908 (1991),
42 See Kaufman, supra note 35, at 1821.
43 Clievigny, supra note 4, at 545 ("too narrow, encompassing the discursive, the descriptive,
even the polemical, and slighting the representational .. one may give information about a
social artifact . . . simply by representing it, by embodying the phenomenon"); see also C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 993 (1978); Kaufman,
.supra note 35, at 1824-25.
44 Magid, supra note 24, at 468.
45 Id.
46 LAunEncE I-I. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 827, 791-92 (2d. ed. 1988); C.
Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. Rm.'. 109, 114 (1986); Rose, supra note 13, at 211.
47
 See 'FRIBE, supra note 46, at 789-90.
° See id. at 791-92; Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 906;
Rose, supra note 13, at 211.
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regulated fits into an established category of unprotected speech,
defined as such because public order and morality outweigh the
speech's "slight social value."" Unprotected speech includes fighting
words, libel, obscenity and speech that "incite[s] an immediate breach
of the peace."5° If the speech or activity is protected, a court will then
determine if it falls into a category that deserves reduced protection,
such as commercial speech. 51
If the speech does not fall into an excludable category, however,
then content-based restrictions on that speech must survive strict scru-
tiny in order to be upheld." Under strict scrutiny, a court will deter-
mine whether the restriction is necessary to the furtherance of a
compelling state interest, and narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
One commentator suggests that a critical factor in this evaluation is
whether the government has used the "least speech-restrictive
means.""
Conversely, the courts evaluate content-neutral regulations under
a lower level of scrutiny, the track two analysis.'" In 1968, in United
States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for re-
viewing such incidental restrictions on expressive conduct. 56 The de-
fendant in the case had been convicted for burning his draft card in
protest to the Vietnam War. 57
 The Court determined that a restriction
on expressive conduct was justified if: 1) the regulation was within the
police power of the government; 2) the regulation furthered an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; 3) the governmental
interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 4)
the incidental restriction was no greater than essential to the further-
ance of the government's interests." Under this standard, the Court
upheld the defendant's conviction, reasoning that the Selective Service
49 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 815 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942); Dienes, supra note 46, at 114;
Rose, supra note 13, at 211 & n.108.
5° See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
5L See. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 907 (commercial speech does no more than
propose a commercial transaction) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v, Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,762 (1976)).
5.4 See Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 906; Rose, supra
note 13, at 211-12.
55 Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 906; Rose, supra note
13, at 211-12.
"Rose, supra note 13, at 212.
55 See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 792; Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Rose, supra note 13, at 212.
56
 See 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968).
57 Id. at 369.
58
 Id. at 377.
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Board had a substantial interest in efficient operation of the draft that
justified the regulation!'g
Viewing the third prong as the content-neutrality threshold re-
quirement, track two analysis can therefore be summarized as requir-
ing incidental restrictions on speech to be narrowly tailored to achieve
a significant government interest.° Commentators have observed that
an important factor in being "narrowly tailored" is the existence of
ample alternative channels of communication. 6 ' Commentators have
described the looser scrutiny of incidental restrictions as a "form of
interest balancing."62
The Supreme Court has thus developed a two-track analysis for
determining the level of scrutiny applicable to restrictions on expres-
sion.63 On track one, a direct restriction on speech receives strict
scrutiny, unless the speech falls into an excludable category." On track
two, an incidental restriction on expression receives a lower level of
scrutiny and must only be narrowly tailored to serve a significant state
interest.°
2. The Public Forum Doctrine
In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly resorted to
an alternative method to the two-track analysis for reviewing restric-
tions of expression on public property, the Public Forum doctrine.°
59 Id. at 382.
°Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
984 (1990).
51 Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Rose, supra note 13, at 213.
"'Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Rose, supra note 13, at 212-13.
es TRIBE, supra note 46, at 791-92; Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Rose, supra note 13, at 211.
64 Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 906; Rose, supra note
13, at 211-12.
65 Dienes, supra note 46, at 114; Rose, supra note 13, at 212-13.
66 Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content
and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1220, 1221 & n.15 (1984),
Based on LEX1S and WESTLAW searches, the authors asserted that the phrase "public forum"
had only appeared in 32 Supreme Court decisions, twice prior to 1970 and 13 times after 1980.
Id. at 1221 8c 11.15. Recent LEXIS and WESTLAW searches of the phrase "public fortnn" reinforce
their observation; since 1984, the phrase arises in 14 cases, 5 after 1990: ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 2705 (1992); Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1992);
Burson v. Freeman 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850 (1992); Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2345 (1991);
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
790 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub.,
486 U.S. 750, 777 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988); Board of Airport Comna'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569,
572 (1987); Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986); Cornelius
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This geographical approach hinges the degree of scrutiny accorded
speech restrictions on a determination of the nature of the speech's
forum.° Commentators theorize that the doctrine represents an at-
tempt to formally accommodate competing societal interests. 58
The Public Forum doctrine originated in Professor Harry Kalven's
1965 article, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, which
wrestled with the fundamental tension between expressive activity and
the primary uses of government property. 59 The article argued for "a
kind of First Amendment easement" to public property such as streets
and parks, for all citizens." Dismissing attempts to separate speech
from conduct as confusing, Professor Kalven called for the develop-,
merit of a "New Robert's Rules of Order" for public fora." According
to the article, accommodating as many speakers as possible without
thwarting a forum's primary purposes should be the courts' focus. 72
Using Professor Kalven's article as a springboard, the Supreme
Court has developed the modern public forum approach." Although
the doctrine's early usage primarily expanded speech opportunities by
focusing on public fora, the Supreme Court recently has sharpened
the original thesis by emphasizing the corollary that speech in non-
public fora can be more freely restricted and such restrictions will be
subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny." Commentators articulate three
general categories established by the Court to aid in determining the
level of scrutiny: the traditional public forum, the designated public
forum and the nonpublic forum: 75
v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 684 (1985).
67 Farber & Nowak, supra note 66, at 1220; Rose, supra note 13, at 202.
68
 Dienes, supra note 46, at 115; Rose, supra note 13, at 202.
69 See Kalven, supra note 41, at 15; Farber & Nowak, supra note 66, at 1221; Dienes, supra
note 46, at 111-12; Stephen R. Welby, Note, Forma/ism in the Forum? United States v. Kokinda
and the Extension of the Public Forum Doctrine, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 957, 957 n.2 (1991). Professor
Kalven derived the inspiration for his theory from Justice Roberts' reasoning twenty-six years
prior:
Wherever the title of street and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org ., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
70 See Kalven, ,supra note 41, at la.
71 See id. at 11-12.
72 See id. at 26-27.
23 See Welby, supra note 69, at 957 n.2.
74 See Dienes, supra note 46, at 110, 116.
75 E.g. Farber & Nowak, supra note 66, at 1220-21 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 46 (1983)); Cindy L. Meyer, Chapter, Free Speech u Public Safety
Within Public Forum Analysis, 59 GEo.WAsn. L. Rev. 1285, 1291 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
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Commentators describe traditional public fora as areas where
expressive activity, such as speech and assembly, has historically oc-
curred and, thus receives the greatest degree of protection. 78
 Commen-
tators frequently cite public parks, streets and sidewalks as "quintessen-
tial examples."" In traditional public fora, regulations must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, and leave open
ample alternatives in order to withstand scrutiny. 78
The second category, the designated public forum, encompasses
property that the government has intentionally opened to the public
for expression. 79
 Restrictions on speech in these fora receive the same
strict scrutiny as those in traditional public fora." Commentators note
that, because the government decides whether the forum becomes
public, it can also limit the forum to certain times or speakers or return
the forum to nonpublic status. 8 ' Justices Kennedy and Souter have
proposed an alternative approach, however, that emphasizes examin-
ing the speech's compatibility with the property's normal uses. 82
The third category, nonpublic fora, comprises property that does
not fit into the first two categories." Commentators explain that speech
& Educ, Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); Rose, supra note 13, at 203. But see David
Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases:  Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public
Officials, 32 Burr, L. REv. 175, 185-202, 202 n.111 (1983) (views forum analysis as more of a
continuum than separate categories).
76 Farber, supra note 66, at 1220; Rose, supra note 13, at 203; Welby, supra note 69, at 960,
961; e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (sidewalk in residential neighborhood);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983) (sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court
building).
77
 Farber, supra note 66, at 1220; Rose, supra note 13, at 203; Welby, supra note 69, at 960.
One commentator argues that if pushed to make a distinction, sidewalks deserve more protection
than streets. Rose, supra note 13, at 204-05.
78 See Farber, supra note 66, at 1220; Welby, .supra note 69, at 961. One commentator reasoned
that speech must be highly protected in public fora because such fora are often the last resort of
the little man," the unpopular and poorly financed. Rose, supra note 13, at 204.
"Farber, supra note 66, at 1221; Dienes, supra note 46, at 119; Welby, supra note 69, at 960;
see, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (state
fairgrounds); Widinar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, '267 (1981) (university meeting facilities). One
commentator argues that whether the government intended to designate the forum for speech
purposes should depend on three factors: 1) the government's policy and practice, 2) the
property's nature, and 3) compatibility with expression. Welby, supra note 69, at 962.
8° See, e.g., ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal & Educ.
Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
81 Dienes, supra note 46, at 119; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Farber, supra note 66, at 1221.
ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2716 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); ISKCON la 112 S.
Ct. at 2724 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Dienes, .supra
note 46, at 118.
83 See Farber, supra note 66, at 1221; Welby, supra note 69, at 960-61 (citing cases); see also
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990) (sidewalk leading to post office); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (military reservation); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
302 (1974) (advertising space in city buses).
1130	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:1121
restrictions in these fora only have to be reasonable, and not aimed at
a particular viewpoint to withstand scrutiny. 84
 In these areas, the gov-
ernment's interests in promoting the forum's primary purpose over-
shadow the public's expressive easement."
Thus, the Public Forum doctrine attempts to reconcile competing
societal interests by varying the scrutiny of speech restrictions accord-
ing to a categorization of the speaker's forum.86 Although, speech
receives heightened protection in traditional and designated public
fora, nonpublic fora regulations must only face a reasonableness stand-
ard." The doctrine therefore promotes the maximization of expres-
sion by focusing on accommodating the multiplicity of interests and
voices."
C. Values Underlying the First Amendment
Ultimately, theories on the meaning of freedom of expression and
its importance guide the resolution of free speech controversies."
Commentators assert three general theories behind the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of free speech: the Marketplace of Ideas, Democratic
Process and Self-Realization." If begging is to be protected under the
First Amendment, it must advance at least one of these theories. 91
The Marketplace of Ideas theory values freedom of speech as a
means of uncovering the best possible perspective or solution." Theo-
rists predicate this model on the belief that truth emerges from open
and robust debate." By refraining from interfering with expression,
the government allows truth and falsehood to grapple openly and the
resulting enlightenment benefits society as a whole. 94
84 Dienes, supra note 46, at 116; Rose, supra note 13, at 203; Welby, supra note 69, at 961;
see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. One commentator determines reasonableness "in light of the
forum's purpose and all surrounding circumstances." Welby, supra note 69, at 9112.
85 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
88 Dienes, supra note 46, at 115; Rose, supra note 13, at 202.
87 Farber, supra note 66, at 1220; Rose, supra note 13, at 202; Welby, supra note 69, at 960,
961.
88 See Kalven, supra note 41, at 26-27.
89 See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898.
" See EMERSON, supra note 22, at 6-7; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898.
91 See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898.
92JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 940 (4th ed. 1991); Baker,
supra note 43, at 964; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898.
93 Baker, supra note 43, at 964; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898; see also Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the
power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market").
94 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 940 (citing .). MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR
THE LIBERTY OF UNLIGENSF,D PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (John W. Hales ed.,
1898)); see also Baker, supra note 43, at 964-65; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898.
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The Democratic Process theory views freedom of speech as essen-
tial to the most effective operation of a democracy.° The best interests
of the community necessitate that the decision-makers and the popu-
lace fully understand the public issues.° This model restricts First
Amendment protection to public discussion of explicitly political is-
sues, but within this sphere grants virtually absolute protection.° All
other speech, including scientific and literary speech receives minimal
protection.°
Shifting away from societal justifications, the Self-Realization
model emphasizes the primacy of freedom of expression in individual
self-development.t1
 Commentators note that expressive freedom en-
ables individuals to define themselves and to give voice to their basic
"human spirit." This model carves a broad sphere for protected
expression, possibly even encompassing all nonviolent, noncoercive
behavior. 10 ' Having such a broad sweep allows the First Amendment to
cover the many "inexpressible emotions" and ideas that defy being
distilled into a discrete message. 102
These three general theories guide interpretation' of the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech.m The Marketplace of Ideas
theory values free speech as the most effective means for uncovering
truth.'" The Democratic Process theory views freedom of speech as a
means to improve citizens functioning within a democratic society. 1 °
The Self-Realization theory values expressive freedom for its role in
individual development. 106
95 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INn, Li. 1,
26 (1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
255 (1961) [hereinafter Absolute]; see generally ALEXANDER MEIELKJOIIN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF"rHE PEOPLE 24 (1948) (discussing role of freedom of speech
in representative democracy) [hereinafter POLITICAL FREEDOM).
96 POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 95, at 26; Hcrshkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 901.
97 14'11E, supra note 46, at 786. But see Absolute, supra note 95, at 256-57 (advocating
inclusion of education, philosophy/science, literature/art).
98 TRIBE, supra note 46, at 786.
99 See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 787; Baker, supra note 43, at 966; Redish, supra note 22, at
593.
11141 Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 903; Redish, supra note 22, at 593.
101
 See Baker, supra note 43, at 964.
192 See Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15, 25, 26 (1971) ("the inexpressible emotions" that
come "under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons");
Baker, supra note 43, at 993 (storytelling as example).
1" See EMERSON, supra note 22, at 6-7; Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 898.
194 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 940; Baker, supra note 43, at 964.
195 See Bork, supra note 95, at 26; Absolute, supra note 95, at '255.
1 °6 See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 787; Baker, supra note 43, at 962; Redish, supra note 22, at
593.
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In sum, a court begins its First Amendment analysis by defining
"speech," and thereby delimiting the scope of protection. 1 °1 A court
must then determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in
evaluating a regulation of protected speech via the two-track analysis
or under the Public Forum doctrine.' 08 Overall, a court will proceed
with its First Amendment analysis guided by various theories of the
speech's importance.m
II. HISTORY OF CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
Courts have used a First Amendment analysis to determine the
relationship between free speech and the solicitation of funds by or-
ganized charities."° Part A of this section explores three Supreme
Court cases in this area from the 1980s, known as the Schaumburg
trilogy, that taken collectively, lay out a broad vision of charitable
solicitation as protected expression."' Part B of this section explores
International Society of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, a recent Supreme
Court case that dealt with charitable solicitation under the Public
Forum doctrine." 2
A. The Schaumburg Trilogy
In 1980, in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, the United States Supreme Court held a regulation of charitable
solicitation to be unconstitutional."s Under the regulation, the Village
of Schaumburg ("Village") denied the Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment ("CBE") a solicitation permit because less than seventy-five per-
cent of CBE's contributions went toward "charitable purposes."" 4 First,
the Court reasoned that charitable solicitation constituted protected
speech under the First Amendment. 15 Second, under strict scrutiny,
the Court determined that the regulation did not sufficiently further
the Village's asserted interests to outweigh the infringement on expres-
ur See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 45-88 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
110 See. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 787-802 (1988); Secretary
of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959-69 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 629-39 (1980); Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at
904.
111 See infra notes 113-207 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 208-256 and accompanying text.
"3 444 U.S. at 639,
114 Id. at 622-25.
115 /d. at 633.
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sion,''' Thus, the Court concluded that the regulation failed First
Amendment scrutiny. " 7
The Village regulated solicitation on public property within its
borders by means of a permit scheme. 118 Before granting a permit, the
Village required organizations to show that at least seventy-five percent
of their receipts went toward charitable purposes."' The Village denied
the application of CBE, an environmental advocacy group, for failure
to meet this standard."' In response, CBE sued the Village alleging that
the seventy-five percent rule contravened the First Amendment."'
First, the Court held that the First Amendment protected charita-
ble solicitation.'" The Court reasoned that the solicitation of funds by
organized groups involved several protectable speech interests —"com-
munication of information, the dissemination and propagation of
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes."'" The Court also empha-
sized that a group's ability to speak depended on donated funds and
thus, the Court considered CBE's door-to-door solicitation protect-
Next, the Court determined that the regulation directly restricted
speech.'" The Court reasoned that the regulation prevented groups
with advocacy as their primary purpose from soliciting in the town."'
The Court emphasized that advocacy groups could reasonably expend
more than twenty-five percent of their funds on administrative costs.'"
Under a track one analysis, the Court concluded that the regulation
unconstitutionally abridged the expressive freedom of advocacy groups
unless justified by sufficiently strong interests of the Village.'"
116 Id. at 636.
117 1d. at 639.
18 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 622-23. SclIAUMBURG VI MACE, ILL., CODE, ch. 22, art. III, § 22-20
states: "Every charitable organization, which solicits or intends to solicit contributions from
persons in the village by door-to-door solicitation or the use of the public streets and public ways,
shall prior to such solicitation apply for a permit."
119
 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 624. SCHAUMBURG VILLAGE, ILL, CODE, ch. 22, art. 111, § 22-20(g)
requires: Islatisfactory proof that at least seventy-five per cent [sic] of the proceeds of such
solicitations will be used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization."
12° Schaumburg, 444 U,S. at 625. Affidavits revealed that in 1975, the Citizens for a Better
Environment ("CBE') spent 23.3% of proceeds on fundraising and 21.5% on administration
while, in 1976, 23.3% went to fundraising and 16.5% to administration. Id. at 626.
121
 Id. at 625.
122 See id. at 626-32 (citing cases).
123
 Id. at 632.
124 Id. at 632-33.
125 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
126 See id. at 635-37.
127 Id. at 635.
125 See id. at 636,
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Finally, the Schaumburg Court determined that the seventy-five
percent rule only "peripherally" advanced the Village's interests while
less speech-restrictive alternatives existed.' 26 The Court addressed three
alleged interests of the Village: preventing fraud, protecting public
safety, and protecting residential privacy,'" First, the Court reasoned
that the Village's principal justification, the prevention of fraud, rested
on the mistaken correlation between the amount spent on administra-
tion and fraud.'S 1
 The Court again stressed that advocacy groups might
reasonably need to spend more than twenty-five percent of receipts on
administration.'" In addition, the Court noted that less intrusive
means would better prevent fraud.'"
Second, the Court dismissed any relation between public safety
and the amount spent on administration.'" Finally, the Court noted
that the seventy-five percent rule only furthered residential privacy
indirectly, by reducing the overall number of solicitors.'" The Court
stressed that solicitors who spent less than twenty-five percent on costs,
and those that spent more, annoyed residents equally." 6 The Court also
suggested that the ability of homeowners to bar solicitors from their
property maintained privacy more effectively, and less intrusively." 7
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's decision extending
First Amendment protection to solicitation.' 38 He reasoned that a com-
munity had the right to insulate itself from causes it deems unworthy.'"
Justice Rehnquist charged the majority's opinion with eviscerating
community control over itself, overvaluing the constitutional impor-
tance of door-to-door solicitation and failing to provide any useful or
coherent guidance to towns affected by the ruling.m
Thus, in Schaumburg, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech protected solicitation by organ-
ized charities."' In its reasoning, the Court emphasized that the Village
129 Id. at 636.
135 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-38.
131 See id. at 636-37.
In Id. at 636-37.
133 1d. at 637. The Court suggested criminalizing fraudulent representations and promoting
disclosure of a charitable organizations' finances as less intrusive alternatives. Id. at 637-38.
134
 Id. at 638.
135 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638.
135 Id
137 1d. at 639.
138 Id. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"9 /d. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14° See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 643-44 {Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141
 See id, at 632.
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ordinance hindered the ability of organizations oriented toward the
advocacy of causes to effectively solicit contributions. 192 The Court
concluded that the seventy-five percent rule was not narrowly tailored
to prevent fraud, especially in light of less speech-restrictive alterna-
tives.'"
Similarly, in 1984, in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., the Court struck down a Maryland regulation on charita-
ble solicitation.'" The regulation allowed for the waiver of a twenty-five
percent limitation on contributions used to finance fundraising activi-
ties if the group would be unable to solicit otherwise.'" First, the Court
relied on Schaumburg to hold that charitable solicitation constituted
protected expression. 146
 Next, the Court reasoned that the possibility
of waiver did not correct the deficiencies in the Schaumburg regula-
tion.'41
 The Court concluded that the regulation violated the First
Amendment.'"
In Munson, the State prohibited charitable organizations from
using more than twenty-five percent of donations to pay their fundrais-
ing expenses. 14" The regulation, however, allowed the Secretary of State
to waive the limitation upon determination that it prevented a charity
from effectively soliciting.'" The plaintiff, a professional fundraiser,
regularly charged a client more than the mandated twenty-five percent
of receipts. 15 ' After being notified of its non-compliance with the regu-
lation, the plaintiff sued, alleging that the statute infringed its First
Amendment rights. 152
142 Id. at 635.
145 Id. at 636,
144 467 U.S. 947,950 (1989),
145 1d. at 950 & n.2.
146 See id. at 959.
147
 See id. at 962-68.
148 Id. at 970.
'	 149 Munson, 467 U.S. at 950. Mo. ANN. Corn OF 1957, art. 41, § 103D stated in pertinent part:
"(a) A charitable organization other than a charitable salvage organization may not pay or agree
to pay as expenses in connection with any fundraising activity a total amount in excess of 25
percent of the total gross income raised or received by reason of the fund-raising activity."
155 See Munson, 467 U.S. at 952. Mu. ANN. Cony, of 1957, art. 41, § 103D stated in pertinent
part:
The Secretary of State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable
organization to pay or agree to pay tar expenses in connection with a fund-raising
activity more than 25% of its total gross income in those instances where the 25%
limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contri-
butions.
151
 Munson, 467 U.S. at 950-51.
152 Id. at 951-52.
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After reviewing Schaumburg, the Court observed that the regula-
tion must fall unless it could be distinguished.' 53 The Court reasoned,
however, that the waiver provision was too narrow to distinguish this
regulation from the one in Schaumburg because the waiver restricted
the exception to financial necessity.'" The Court emphasized that the
waiver did not apply to organizations that chose to divert more than
twenty-five percent of their receipts to administration for strategic
reasons.' 55 The Court also determined that the waiver provision failed
to address the regulation's flawed premise, that high solicitation costs
correlate to fraud.'" The Court noted that the regulation in no way
prevented the actual fraudulent misdirection of funds, although it did
restrict the speech of groups that chose high-cost strategies.' 57 Thus,
the Court concluded that the twenty-five percent limitation unneces-
sarily chilled the exercise of free speech.'"
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist distinguished the regu-
lation from the Schaumburg ordinance.'" He first reasoned that the
statute merely regulated the organizations' economic relations with
professional fundraisers.'" Justice Rehnquist noted that any impact on
speech was indirect and outweighed by governmental interests. 15 ' Fur-
thermore, Justice Rehnquist emphasized the statute's "crucial" differ-
ences from the Schaumburg regulation.'" Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the regulation survived First Amendment scrutiny.'"
In sum, in Munson, the Supreme Court further developed the
Schaumburg holding that charitable solicitation constituted protected
speech.' In its reasoning, the Munson Court highlighted the mistaken
premise of the regulation at issue, that high administrative costs indi-
153 1d. at 959-62.
154 See id. at 963.
155 See id. The Court used the example of a group enduring high costs because they elected
to disseminate information as part of fundraising. Id.
156 Munson, 467 U.S. at 966.
137 Id. at 966-67.
133 See id. at 968.
159 Id. at 975 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166 1d. at 978-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161 Munson, 467 U.S. at 979-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 981-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). First, Justice Rehnquist observed that the regu-
lation did not include administrative and overhead costs unrelated to solicitation in calculating
the 25%. Id. at 982. Second, he noted that the statute also excluded many costs from combined
solicitation-advocacy events. Id. Third, Justice Rehnquist emphasized the waiver provision. Id. at
983. Fourth, he observed that the regulation apparently allocated remaining expenses pro rata
between solicitation and advocacy. Id. at 983-84.
163 See id. at 985 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164
 See id. at 962.
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cated fraud.'" 5
 Therefore, the Court concluded that despite the waiver
provisions, the regulation in Munson was unconstitutional. 166
In 1988, in the final case of the trilogy, Riley v. National Federation
of the Blind of North Carolina, the Supreme Court struck down a regu-
lation on solicitation by professional fundraisers. 167 A group of profes-
sional fundraisers, charities and possible donors challenged a statute
that set fundraisers' fees and governed their activities.'" The Court
reiterated that the First Amendment protected charitable solicita-
tion.'" The Court also emphasized that the fundraisers' professional
status did not alter their First Amendment rights."" Thus, the Court
held the regulation unconstitutional."'
The regulation in Riley had three relevant provisions.' 72
 First, the
reasonable fee provision set up a three-tier scheme for evaluating
professional fundraisers' fees against total contributions.'" The regu-
lation deemed fees constituting up to twenty percent of the gross
receipts of all solicitations to be reasonable, those between twenty and
thirty-five percent presumptively reasonable unless shown not to in-
volve advocacy interests, and fees over thirty-five percent presumptively
16' Id. at 966.
' 66 Munson, 467 U.S. at 970.
167 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988).
168 See id. at 786-87.
1599 Id. at 789.
170 See id. at 801-02.
171 Id. at 803.
172 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 789.
'm See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-17.2 (1986) provided:
(a) No professional fund-rais[er] ... may charge ... an excessive and unreason-
able fund-raising fee... .
(b) [A] fund-raising fee of twenty percent (20%) or less of the gross receipts of
all solicitations . . . is deemed to he reasonable and nonexcessive.
(c)[A] fund-raising fee greater than twenty percent (20%) but less than thirty-five
percent (35%) of the gross receipts of all solicitations . . . is excessive and unrea-
sonable if the party challenging the fund-raising fee also proves that the solicitation
does not involve the dissemination of information, discussion, or advocacy relating
to public issues as directed by the [charitable organization] which is to bandit from
the solicitation.
(d) [A] fund-raising fee of thirty-five percent (35%) or more of the gross receipts
of all solicitations.. .. may be excessive and unreasonable without further evi-
dence.... The professional fund-rais(er] ... may successfully defend the fund-rais-
ing fee by proving that the level of the fee charged was necessary:
(1) Because of the dissemination of information, discussion, or advocacy relating
to public issues as directed by the [charitable organization) which is to benefit from
the solicitation, or
(2) Because otherwise the ability of the [charitable organization] which is to
benefit from the solicitations to raise money or communicate its ideas, opinions,
and positions to the public would be significantly diminished,
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unreasonable unless justifiable on the grounds of advocacy or financial
necessity.' 74
 Second, the regulation required professional fundraisers
to disclose to potential donors the percentage of revenues retained as
a fee in prior solicitations.'" Finally, the regulation required profes-
sional fundraisers to obtain a license before engaging in charitable
solicitation.'"
The Court first held that the reasonable fee provision was indis-
tinguishable from the percentage based fee schemes held unconstitu-
tional in Schaumburg and Munson.'" The plaintiff in Riley attempted
to distinguish the statute by asserting an interest in promoting the
maximum yield to the charity, but the Court disagreed for three rea-
sons.'" First, the Court thought this justification reflected an incorrect
view of solicitation as merely commercial speech, and thus subject to
less protection under the First Amendment, an issue firmly settled by
Schaumburg.'" Second, the Court considered paternalistic protection
of charities misplaced in areas of free speech. 18° Third, the Court
stressed valid reasons that charities may stray from the statutory guide-
lines."' Finally, the Court determined that the ability to rebut the fee
presumptions chilled free expression, rather than distinguishing the
regulation."' The Court observed that this system forced charities to
defend their tactics on a case-by-case basis.'" Therefore, according to
the Court, the specter of litigation would always overshadow efforts at
174 Riley, 487 U.S. at 784-85.
175 1d. at 784; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-16.1 (1986) provided:
During any solicitation and before requesting or appealing either directly or
indirectly for any charitable contribution a professional solicitor shall disclose to
the person solicited:
(1) His name; and,
(2) The name of the . . professional fund-rais[er] 	 . by whom he is employed
and the address of his employer; and
(3) The average of the percentage of gross receipts actually paid to the [charitable
organizations] by the professional fund-rais[er]	 . conducting the solicitation for
all charitable sales promotions conducted in this State by that professional fund-
rais[er] ... for the past 12 months, or for all completed charitable sales promotions
where the professional fund-rais[erl ... has been soliciting funds for less than 12
months.
176 Riley, 487 U.S. at 784; N.C. GEN.	 § 131C-6 (1986) provided: "Any person who acts
as a professional fund-rais[er] ... shall apply for and obtain an annual license from the Depart-
ment, and shall not act as a professional fund-mis[er] ... until after obtaining such license."
177 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 787-95.
178 Id. at 789-90.
179 Id. at 790.
18° Id. at 790-91.
181
 Id. at 791-92.
182
 Riley, 487 U.S. at 792-94.
183 Id. at 793.
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solicitation and obtaining professional help, especially for small and
unpopular groups.'" Thus, the Court declared the statute's reasonable
fee scheme unconstitutional.'"
The Court next considered the disclosure requirement and con-
cluded that it directly restricted speech.'" The Court reasoned that by
mandating specific speech, the provision became a content-based re-
striction, properly subject to exacting scrutiny.' 51 Noting that existing
law already required disclosure of professional status upon request, the
Court determined that the intangible benefits from wider publicity of
the message outweighed the state's asserted interests in fraud preven-
tion.'" Furthermore, the Court again emphasized the undue injury to
small and unpopular charities forced to rely on professionals.'" Finally,
the Court noted the existence of more narrowly tailored alternatives.'"
Thus, the Court concluded that the disclosure requirement failed to
withstand First Amendment strict scrutiny. 19 '
Finally, the Court invalidated the licensing requirement, stressing
that speakers do not lose First Amendment rights merely because they
are compensated.' 92
 By allowing a limitless delay, the Court reasoned
that the statute accorded the licensor too much discretion.' 95
 Thus, the
Court concluded that the licensing scheme unreasonably regulated the
time, place and manner of speech.'"
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued against
subjecting the regulation of professional fundraisers to strict scrutiny. 195
184 See id. at 793-94.
'Nr' Id. at 784.
188 See id. at 795-801.
187
 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-96. The Court refused to separate the commercial component
of the speech from the "persuasive" part. Id. Also, the Court noted that precedents revealed no
distinction of constitutional significance between compelled speech and compelled silence. Id.
at 796.
"8 See id. at 798.
189
 Id. at 799.
190
 Id. at 800. The Court noted that the state could publish financial disclosure statements
itself, or more vigorously enforce existing antifraud statutes. Id.
191
 Id. at 803.
192 See Riley, 487 U.S. al 801-02.
195 See id. at 802.
194 See id. In a concurring opinionjustice Scalia agreed with the majority despite questioning
dictum indicating that requiring a fundraiser merely to disclose professional status would with-
stand First Amendment scrutiny. See id, at 803 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred
with most of the majority's opinion but dissented from the Court's conclusion that the licensing
requirement was unconstitutional. Id. at 804 (Stevens, j., concurring).
195 See id. at 808 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). In 1986, subsequent to the Schaumburg and
Munson decisions, Justice Rehnquist was elevated to the position of Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
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First, he argued that the reasonable fee provision was merely an eco-
nomic regulation with only a minimal burden on speech.' 96 Chief
Justice Rehnquist further argued that the fee provision would even
withstand strict scrutiny because of the government's strong interest
in preventing fraud and the fact that the regulation was not a blanket
prohibition.' 97
 Second, the Chief Justice addressed the disclosure re-
quirement and determined that requiring the disclosure of true facts
in a commercial transaction did not infringe on free speech. 198 Finally,
he approved the licensing requirement on the grounds that it only
incidentally affected the charities' speech.'" Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the entire regulation deserved a lower degree of scru-
tiny and should stand. 90°
In Riley, the Supreme Court elaborated on the Schaumburg and
Munson holdings, explicitly extending First Amendment protection to
professional fundraisers' activities."' In its reasoning, the Court em-
phasized the regulation's burden on the speech of small and unpopu-
lar advocacy groups.202 The Court concluded that the regulation's three
provisions, the reasonable fee scheme, the disclosure requirement and
the licensing requirement, all failed to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny. 2"
The Schaumburg trilogy establishes that charitable solicitation con-
stitutes protected speech under the First Amendment. 204 The three
cases note that solicitation cannot be separated from a group's essen-
tial message.2D5 Charitable solicitation aids in disseminating the mes-
sage as well as ensuring its continuing survival. 206
 In addition, the
Supreme Court has indicated that those who personally benefit from
the solicitation, such as professional fundraisers, nevertheless retain
First Amendment protection."'
" See id. at 807 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
m Riley, 487 U.S. at 808, 809 (Rehnquist, C.f., dissenting).
" Id. at 811 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
1 °`•) Id. at 812 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
2D° See id. at 814 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
2° 1 See id. at 787-95, 801-02.
202 Riley, 487 U.S. at 793, 799.
243 See id. at 803.
2°4 See id. at 787-95; Secretary of State of Md. y ,Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959
(1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 494 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
205 E.g. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; Munson, 467 U.S. at 959-60; Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
206 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; Munson, 467 U.S. al 959-60; Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
207 Riley, 487 U.S. at 801-02.
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B. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
Then, in 1992, in International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee ("ISKCON I"), the Supreme Court upheld a New York Port
Authority regulation banning in-person solicitation of funds in airport
terminals. 2"8 In a companion decision, Lee v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness ("ISKCON II"), the Court struck down the same
regulation as applied to the distribution of literature.m The regulation
prevented the Krishna adherents from performing sankirtan, a ritual
involving in-person solicitation of funds, in New York metropolitan
airports. 21 " Under the Public Forum doctrine, the ISKCON I Court
reasoned that the airport was a nonpublic forum, therefore the regu-
lation only had to be reasonable. 2 " The Court concluded that the Port
Authority's interests in limiting solicitation were reasonable and the
regulation could stand. 212 The ISKCON II Court, however, determined
that leafletting did not present the same "dangers" as solicitation. 218
Thus, the Court struck clown the prohibition on distributing literature
in the terminal. 2 " Writing separately, in International Society of Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee ("ISKCON III"), Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter focused their forum analyses more on the objective charac-
teristics of the terminals than had the ISKCON I Court.2 ' 5
The ISKCON I Court determined that the airport terminals were
nonpublic fora because neither tradition nor purpose indicated oth-
208 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1902). The Port Authority regulation stated in pertinent part:
1. The f011owing conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or
structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a
continuous or repetitive manner:
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to
jewelry, foodstuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any other
printed or written material.
(c) Solicitation or receipt of funds.
Id. at 2704.
2°9 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992).
21 ° ISKCON 1, 112 S. Ct. at 2704.
211 Id, at 2705-06.
212 See id. at 2706, 2709.
213 /SKCON11, 112 S. CL at 2710 (citing reasoning in ISKCON ///, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2713-14
(1992) (O'Connor, j., concurring)).
211 Id. at 2710.
215 See 112 S. Ct. at 2712, 2716 (O'Connor,,]., concurring); ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2716
(Kennedy, J., concurring); ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (Sower, j., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
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erwise.2 ' 6
 First, the Court reasoned that the relatively recent historical
emergence of airports prevented them from qualifying as traditional
public fora. 217 Second, the Court decided that the terminals were not
designated public fora because the Port Authority considered their
purpose the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion of
expression. 21 ° Moreover, the Court found no indication in the manner
of operation of the airports that the terminals had been dedicated to
open expression. 219 After ruling out traditional and designated public
fora, the Court concluded that the airport terminals were nonpublic
fora and the regulation should be held to a reasonableness standard. 22°
Under this reasonableness standard, the Court articulated the
Port Authority's three legitimate interests in banning in-person solici-
tation. 22 ' First, the Court stressed that solicitation had a disruptive
effect on business.222 Second, the Court observed that in-person solici-
tation impeded the flow of traffic. 2" Third, according to the Court,
face-to-face solicitation presented risks of duress, an appropriate target
for regulation.224 The Court then noted that the alternative of perform-
ing sankirtan on the sidewalk outside the terminal mitigated adverse
effects on speech. 226 The ISKCON I Court concluded that these inter-
ests justified the regulation as reasonable and thus constitutional. 226
In ISKCON II, the Court invalidated the companion ban on dis-
tribution of literature in Port Authority terminals. 227 As justification,
the ISKCON //Court cited the reasoning in justices O'Connor's, Ken-
nedy's and Souter's separate ISKCON III opinions that followed. 228 In
a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the
Court's invalidation of the prohibition on literature distribution. 229 The
216
 ISKCON 1,112 S. Ct. at 2706, 2708.
217 Id. at 2706. In addition, solicitation in airports did not appear until recently, too late even
to be traditional solely for airports. Id. The Court dismissed the argument that the terminals were
heir to the expressive activity traditionally conducted at "transportation nodes," such as train
stations. Id. at 2707. The Court noted that bus and train stations were often under private
ownership and, moreover, that airports may have critical differences with more conventional
transportation nodes. Id.
2111 1d. at 2707.
219 Id.
229 See id. at 2708.
221 See ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2708.
24 Id.
24 Id.
224 Id.
229 Id. at 2708-09.
226 See ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2708-09.
227 /SKCON //, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992).
226 Id.
229 Id. at 2710 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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Chief Justice emphasized that leafletting presented identical conges-
tion risks as solicitation, in addition to unique problems, such as the
creation of litter. 230
 The Chief Justice concluded that without a more
significant distinction between the risks presented by the two activities,
the Court's decision allowed excludable conduct in through the back
door, 23 '
In an opinion in ISKCON III,Justice O'Connor concurred in both
the ISKCON I and ISKCON II decisions.232
 She agreed that the termi-
nals were nonpublic fora and therefore, the regulation should be held
to a reasonableness standard.233
 Justice O'Connor, however, empha-
sized that reasonableness must be determined in light of all surround-
ing circumstances. 234 She argued that the airport terminals constituted
a large multipurpose complex rather than an environment with the
sole purpose of air trave1. 235
 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor concluded
that in-person solicitation was incompatible with the terminals' func-
tioning in a way that leafletting was not and thus, concurred with the
Court's decisions.236
In ISKCON III, Justice Kennedy also agreed with the Court's
results in ISKCON I and //, despite concluding that the terminals were
public fora, 237 He argued that basing forum status on the government's
express characterization, as the majority did, eviscerated the First
Amendment by allowing the government to set the standard of re-
view.238 Instead, Justice Kennedy advocated focusing on a property's
actual objective qualities, and articulated three factors to examine."'
In his opinion, the Court should consider a property's shared physical
similarities with traditional public fora, whether the government has
permitted broad public access to the property, and whether expressive
activity would interfere in a significant way with the uses of the prop-
erty. 24°
2" Id. (Rehnquist, C,11., dissenting),
231 See id. (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
252 112 S. CL at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
233 Id. at 2711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
294 1d. at 2712 (O'Connor, j., concurring).
235 Id. at 2712-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that the terminals
flinctioned as ma shopping mall as well as an airport." Id. at 2713.
2" See id. at 2713-15 (O'Connor, j., concurring).
237 ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2" See id. at 2716 (Kennedy, j., concurring). justice Kennedy also admonished the C.ourt fdr
taking refuge in “history;" he contended that the reality must be faced that new "public fora" will
develop as society changes. Id. at 2717,
2" Id. at 2716,2718 (Kennedy, j., concurring).
240 Id. at 2718 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also suggested taking into account
the availability of reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. Id. at 2718.
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Applying this standard to the facts before him, Justice Kennedy
determined that the terminals were public fora." Nevertheless, he
reasoned that the solicitation ban survived the strict scrutiny test. 242
Justice Kennedy emphasized the prevention of fraud and duress, often
linked to in-person solicitation, and the existence of satisfactory alter-
natives."' On the other hand, he concluded that the distribution ban
could not withstand the scrutiny of a public forum. 244 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that leafletting presented less risk of fraud and that the
regulation left open fewer alternatives. 245
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Souter agreed
with striking down the distribution ban, but argued that the solicitation
ban also failed First Amendment scrutiny. 246
 He supported Justice Ken-
nedy's conception of the Public Forum doctrine, asserting that the
classification of government property should rest on the compatibility
of its uses and physical characteristics with expressive activity. 247 Justice
Souter agreed that the terminals were public fora, and the regulation
should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 248 Unlike Justice Kennedy, how-
ever, he concluded that solicitation for immediate payment was com-
patible with the airport terminals and the ban should be invalidated. 219
In ISKCON, the Supreme Court used the Public Forum doctrine
to determine the appropriate degree of scrutiny to review the Port
Authority's regulation of expressive activity.25° The majority opinion
241 Id. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring). First, he emphasized the physical similarities be-
tween the airport corridors and the quintessential public fora, public streets. Id. Next, he noted
that the terminals were open to the public without restriction. Id. Finally, Justice Kennedy found
that expressive activity was compatible with the function of the airport. Id.
242 ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2720 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243 See id. at 2721, 2722-23 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy interpreted the
regulation to prohibit only solicitation for immediate payment, leaving open such alternatives as
handing out preaddressed envelopes. Id. at 2723.
244 Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246 a at 2724-25 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
247 ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). justice
Souter described the forum analysis categories as "archetypes," representing broad characteristics
of fora. See id. Moreover, he warned of the twin dangers of allowing history to close a category
and of treating the categories as overly static. Id.
248 Id. at 2725 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in .part).
249 See id. at 2725, 2726 (Sower, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Souter
argued against the solicitation ban for primarily two reasons. See id. at 2725. He first concluded
that no strong government interest justified the prohibition. See id. at 2725-26. Justice Souter
reasoned that pedestrians' relative freedom to simply walk away undermined the asserted interest
in preventing fraud and duress. Id. He also dismissed the alleged interest in combatting conges-
tion by noting the corridors' similarity to city streets. Id. at 2725 n.l. Second, Justice Souter
indicated the lack of reasonable alternatives, and dismissed Justice Kennedy's suggestion of
distributing preaddressed envelopes as unrealistic. Id. at 2727.
250
 See ISKCON 1, 112 S. Ct. at 2705.
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reasoned that the airports were nonpublic fora because neither tradi-
don nor the Port Authority's characterization of the terminals' pur-
poses indicated otherwise."' Therefore, the Court concluded that the
solicitation ban was constitutional and the distribution ban was not.'"
The separate opinions in ISKCON III however, suggested that forum
analysis should focus more on the objective physical characteristics of
the airport, and their compatibility with solicitation and leafletting. 255
In sum, the ISKCON decision accepts the basic holding of the
Schaumburg trilogy, that charitable solicitation is so intertwined with
dissemination of a group's message that it deserves First Amendment
protection.'" The ISKCON Court, however, determined the degree of
scrutiny with which to review the Port Authority regulation via a Public
Forum doctrine analysis."" The Court effectively tied its balancing of
competing interests to a characterization of the nature of the forum.256
III. TREATMENT OF BEGGING BY THE COURTS
Unlike charitable solicitation, begging, until recently, has received
scant attention from the courts."' In fact, when a begging case ap-
peared before a court, the court often overlooked the First Amend-
ment element entirely. 258
 Those precedents that raised beggars' First
Amendment rights reveal an inconsistent approach to begging regula-
tions.'"
In 1976, in Ulmer v. Municipal Court, the California Court of
Appeals upheld a statute that prohibited accosting another individual
for begging purposes."'" After noting the regulation's purpose as pre-
251 Id. at 2705-08,
252 Id. at 2709; ISKCON II, 1 12 S. Ct. at 2710.
253 See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2712 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 2716 (Kennedy,l,
concurring); Id at 2724 (Souterd., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
254 ISKCON 1,112 S. CL 2701, 2705 (1992).
255 Id. at 2705-06.
25" See id. at 2705.
257
 Rose, supra note 13, at 193. One commentator gives four reasons for the "dearth" of
precedents: 1) low priority of law enforcement, 2) beggars often lack wherewithal to challenge
regulations, 3) long historical roots of anti-begging laws make them more accepted, 4) courts
never even address the First Amendment issue, Id. at 193-95.
258 .See, e.g., State v. Hunclley, 142 S.E. 330, 330-32 (N.D. 1928) (court upheld anti-begging
law despite focusing analysis entirely on organized charities); Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613,
614-17 (D. Utah 1969) (law criminalizing loitering/begging invalidated for vagueness and over-
breadth without. raising the First Amendment).
259 See Rose, supra note 13, at 193.
260 127 Cal. Rpm 445, 447 (1st Dist. 1976). The California Penal Code criminalizes "(c)
	 .
accost[ingj other persons in any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose
of begging or soliciting alms." CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West Stipp. 1993). The petitioner
contended that he had been soliciting for "the Son of Man 'temple for scientific research on the
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venting the "annoyance" of begging, the court found no necessary
nexus between begging and the communication of ideas. 261 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that begging was not protected speech. 262
The court dismissed a vagueness argument, noting the clear import of
the words, "[w]alking up to and approaching another for the purpose
of soliciting."263 The court concluded that the ordinance fell outside
the protective sweep of the First Amendment and was constitutional. 264
Conversely, in 1984, in C.G.B. v. State of Florida, the First District
Court of Appeals of Florida ruled that a Jacksonville municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting begging was unconstitutionally overbroad and vio-
lative of the First Amendment. 265 First, the court articulated the city's
interests in safeguarding against public annoyance and facilitating
traffic flow.'" The court reasoned, however, that, balanced against the
beggar's rights, these interests did not justify totally depriving the
appellant from seeking sustenance through panhandling.267 The court
concluded that the ordinance encroached upon the appellant's rights
to solicit alms and, therefore, violated the First Arnendment. 268
Then, in 1990, in Young v. New York City Transit Authority, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
begging prohibition did not violate freedom of speech.269 Two home-
less individuals brought a class action suit challenging a Transit Author-
ity ban on begging in the subway system. 27° The court reasoned that
the regulation advanced substantial Transit Authority interests without
unduly infringing on speech rights."' In dicta, the court questioned
disease of sickle-cell anemia," though this was not established on the record. Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr.
at 447.
261 Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
262 See id.
263 Id. at 447-48. The court reasoned that the regulation did not include anyone "who merely
sits or stands by the wayside." Id.
261 Id. at 447.
265 458 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Jacksonville City Ordinance 330.105 made it
unlawful 'to ,beg or solicit alms in the streets or public places of the city or exhibit oneself for
the purpose of begging or obtaining alms." Id.
266 1d. at 48.
267 See id. at 50. The court distinguished this case from Ulmer, where the statute only dealt
with "accosting," Id. at 49.
268 See id. at 48, 50.
269 903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
27° Id. at 148. The plaintiffs challenged the regulation under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and challenged a state anti-begging law, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1),
under the New York State Constitution. Id. at 148, 151. That state law was also challenged in Loper
V. New York City Police Dept, 802 F. Stipp. 1029, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). See infra notes 328-374
and accompanying text for a discussion of Loper
271 See id. at 157-61.
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whether begging constituted expressive conduct and determined that
the subway constituted a nonpublic forum.272
 The court upheld the
regulation because it was narrowly tailored to achieve a significant
governmental interest, and therefore survived constitutional scrutiny
under the track two analysis articulated in O'Brien. 273
To help maintain a safe and effective public transportation system,
the Transit Authority had a longstanding prohibition on begging:274 In
1989, the Transit Authority amended the regulation to increase access
for organized charities, subject to some location restrictions. 275
 Simul-
taneously, the Transit Authority instituted "Operation Enforcement,"
an attempt to escalate enforcement of the panhandling prohibition. 276
In analyzing the panhandling ban, the court fi rst expressed doubts
that begging deserved First Amendment protection.'" The court
speculated that, under the Spence standard, beggars probably intended
no "particularized" message. 278
 Even assuming a potential message, the
court determined that witnesses were unlikely to be able to discern the
message:27" Moreover, the court suggested that the inherent aggressive-
ness of begging in the subway might overshadow any expressive die-
ment.28" Finally, the court noted that the only message common in
begging, the desire for money, did not coincide with the First Amend-
ment's underlying values. 28 '
The court also distinguished begging from charitable solicita-
tion.'" The court first noted that the Schaumburg trilogy dealt only with
the nexus between organized charities' solicitation and various speech
interests.'" Second, the court emphasized that the Transit Authority
was able to distinguish the two when it amended the regulation to
272 1d. at 153-57, 161-62.
275 1d. at 157-61, 164. In addition, the court upheld N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240,35(1) under the
New York State Constitution's Due Process clause. See id. at 164.
274 Young, 903 E2d at 148. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RECS., tit. 21, § 1050.6(b) (1989) states:
no person, unless duly authorized . . . shall upon any facility or conveyance . . . solicit alms,
subscription or contribution for any purpose."
275 Young, 903 F.2d at 148.
276 !d. at 149. "Operation Enforcement" resulted irons a study indicating that begging engen-
dered public intimidation and concern. See id.
277 Id, at 153.
278 Id. The court contrasted begging with clear-cut acts of symbolic conduct See id. (citing
cases).
270 Id. at 153-54.
280 young, 903 F.2d at 154.
281 See id. The court also separated incidental conversations with subway passengers hum
begging, the conduct being regulated. See id.
282 Id, at 156.
255 1d. at 155.
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permit access by organized charities. 2°4 Finally, the court emphasized
the commonsense difference that organized charities benefitted the
community while begging was a "menace to the common good." 285
Ultimately, however, the court grounded its decision on an analysis of
the regulation, not on whether begging was protected under the First
Amendment.286
Assuming that begging fell within the purview of the First Amend-
ment, the court then determined that the regulation withstood scru-
tiny under the O'Brien. standard.287 First, the court noted that the
Transit Authority had a substantial interest in providing the general
populace with reasonably safe public transportation.mi In the context
of the subway, begging threatened that interest because the court
viewed it as tantamount to assault. 289 Second, the court determined that
the regulation satisfied the content-neutrality prong because the ban
attempted to regulate begging's effect on safety and efficiency, not any
communicative element. 29° Finally, the court determined that the regu-
lation was sufficiently tailored despite being a total ban. 291 Noting that
regulations were not required always to be the least restrictive, the
court deferred to the Transit Authority's judgment that controlling the
negative effects of begging necessitated a total ban. 292 In addition, the
court emphasized that the rest of the city remained as an alternative
forum, thus mitigating the regulation's effect. 293
Although the court did not analyze the regulation under the
Public Forum doctrine, in dicta, the court determined that the Transit
Authority did not intend to designate the subway a limited public
forum.294 The court emphasized that Operation Enforcement actually
indicated a contrary intent. 295 Furthermore, the court held that the
subways could be opened to organized charities without necessarily
opening the forum for all conduct. 295 The court concluded that the
2144 Id. at 155-56. The court emphasized that, while evidence abounded that begging engen-
dered intimidation in passengers, no evidence indicated the same consequences for charitable
solicitation. Id. at 156.
288 Young, 903 F.2d at 156.
286 Id. at 154, 161.
287 Id. at 157, 161.
288 Id. at 158.
289 Id,
29° Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
291 See id. at 159, 160.
4r2 id. at 160.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 161-62.
295 Young, 903 F.2d at 161.
29' 1 Id. at 161-62.
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subway qualified as a nonpublic forum and held the regulation to the
same level of scrutiny as applied under the O'Brien standard.297
Judge Meskill, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the statute did not violate the First
Amendment. 298
 Judge Meskill perceived no constitutionally meaningful
distinction between charitable solicitation and begging, which also
furthered the speech interests articulated by the Schaumburg trilog-y. 2"9
He argued that begging should be protected equally by the First
Amendment.")
Next, Judge Meskill determined that the subway was a limited
public fortim. 30 ' He reasoned that by amending the regulation to
permit organized charities, the Transit Authority effectively designated
the subways as public fora." 2
 judge Meskill concluded that the regula-
tion was subject to the stricter scrutiny of a public forum."
Finally, judge Meskill argued that, under strict scrutiny, the Transit
Authority's interests did not justify the begging prohibition. 304
 He em-
phasized the lack of any distinction between purely passive begging,
"which would hardly daunt the average New Yorker," and more aggres-
sively intrusive conduct. 3"5 Conceding the significance of having a safe
and efficient subway system, Judge Meskill suggested that, while the
Transit Authority might proscribe aggressive behavior or confine solic-
iting to certain areas, it could not prohibit begging entirely. 34"' Judge
Meskill concluded that the regulation failed to withstand the level of
scrutiny accorded speech restrictions in public fora. 9° 7
In sum, the Young court held that a ban on begging in the New
York subways did not infringe on beggars' freedom of speech." The
court reasoned that the Transit Authority's interests in providing ef-
ficient public transportation justified the regulation." In addition, the
'297 See id.
298 Id. at 164 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Meskill concurred
with the state law issue, however. Id,
259 Id. at 164 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
300 See Young, 905 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3°1 Id. at 166 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
302 1d. (Meskill,,., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
303 See id. at 167 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"Id. at 167-68 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
303
 Young, 903 E2d at 168 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Meskill
pointed out that there was also no evidence that passengers did not feel harassed when ap-
proached by solicitors from organized charities. Id. at 167 n.1, 168.
"Id. at 168 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
307 Id. at 167-68 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"Id. at 164.
3°° Id. at 158.
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court suggested that begging did not constitute protectable speech and
that the subways were not public fora such that the regulation should
be given greater scrutiny."° Therefore, the Young court concluded that
the regulation should stand. 31 '
Conversely, in 1991, in Blair v. Shanahan, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California held a state prohibi-
tion of begging unconstitutional."' A former panhandler sought rec-
ompense for damages suffered from police enforcement of the ban.'"
The court diverged from the Young decision and drew a parallel be-
tween the speech interests involved in begging and those present in
charitable solicitation." 4 The court concluded that the statute violated
the First Amendment."'
The Blair court found no significant First Amendment distinction
between begging and solicitation by organized charities."' The court
reasoned that begging promoted the same speech values because,
more than a mere commercial exchange, beggars disseminate infor-
mation on their situation and poverty in general. 317 The court stressed
that constitutional protection continues even though beggars repre-
sent only themselves and intend to keep the receipts. 318
In so concluding, the court declined to follow the Young deci-
sion."' The court noted that factual differences between the subway
and the street might reconcile the two decisions, but refused to take
this path.3241 Moreover, the court described as "disturbing," the Young
court's characterization of begging as "a menace to the common
good."32 I
Reasoning that the prohibition affected a public forum, the street,
the court then strictly scrutinized the state's interests in prohibiting
begging.322 First, the court dismissed as uncompelling the idea that the
statute prevented public annoyance. 323 Second, the court determined
310 Young, 903 F.2d at 153, 162.
311 Id. at 164.
312 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1329 (ND. Cal. 1991).
313 /c/. at 1317.
314 See id. at 1322-23,
313 See id. at 1325.
316
 Id. at 1322.
317 Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
318 1d. at 1323. The court analogized the beggar to a professional fundraiser whose primary
goal is to effectuate monetary donations. See id. at 1323-24.
319 Id. at 1323.
32° See id. at 1322 & n.5.
321
 Id. at 1323 n.9.
322 See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324.
323 Id. But see Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48 (finding purpose behind statute supported
enforcement).
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that preventing intrusion on the public at large also failed to be
compelling."' Finally, the court conceded that while preventing "coer-
cive" or "intimidating" activity was compelling, the statute at issue was
not sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve that interest."' The court
emphasized that existing laws already protected the public from such
threatening conduct."6
 Thus, the court struck down the statute as
violative of the First Amendment. 327
Following in the wake of Blair, in October 1992, in Loper v. New
York City Police Department, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York struck down a New York City ordinance
criminalizing begging. 328
 Two homeless individuals challenged the stat-
ute in a class action suit, claiming violations of the First, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."' Under the First Amendment analysis, the
court first noted that begging was protected speech, and then deter-
mined that the beggars' rights outweighed competing interests.'" The
court concluded that the regulation failed to withstand First Amend-
ment scrutiny."'
The New York City Police Department used the criminal begging
law to justify organized campaigns to reduce begging. 332
 The police
argued that allowing the persistence of minor forms of disorder, such
as begging or broken windows, fosters more serious crime by under-
mining the public sense of order."' Under this "Broken Windows"
theory, the police attempted to combat crime by reasserting an orderly
society."' On the other hand, the homeless plaintiffs depended on
begging as their sole means of support."' Although never arrested or
summonsed, the plaintiffs had been occasionally ordered by the police
to "move along," under threat of the regulation. 336
324 Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 See id. at 1325.
328 802 F. Supp. 1029,1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) stated in pertinent.
part "A person is guilty of loitering when he: 1. Loiters, remains or wanders about in a public
place for the purpose of begging. . .." See supra note 273 for the Young court's disposition or
this statute under the New York State Constitution.
329 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1033. The court did not deal with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims because it decided on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 1047-48,
33° See id. at 1036-37,1097.
331 Id. at 1047.
332 1d. at 1034.
533 See id.
334 See Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1034; see also infra notes 378-388 for a discussion of the Broken
Windows theory.
333 /d. at 1033.
336 Id.
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The court began by analogizing begging to sankirtan, the Krishna
ritual of in-person solicitation held to be protected speech in ISK-
CON."' Dismissing the differences between begging and solicitation by
organized charities as "largely semantic," the court reasoned that the
two activities conveyed identical messages.s 38 The court noted that
attempting to disentangle the expressive element from conduct would
be futile in this instance. 339 The court concluded that begging fell
within the scope of the First Amendment."'
Next, the court examined whether the statute could survive con-
stitutional scrutiny."' The court first determined that the statute was
content-based because it targeted the beggars' message. 342 The court
emphasized the disparate treatment accorded solicitors for organized
charities and beggars "standing side-by-side" despite identical mes-
sages.343 According to the court, the Broken Windows rationale only
highlighted the fact that the regulation targeted begging's societal
message.344 The court concluded that the regulation was not content-
neutral and deserved strict scrutiny. 343
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the Loper court faulted the total
ban, for effectively closing all alternatives. 346 The court emphasized that
other New York laws already addressed problem conduct. 947 The court
concluded that the regulation was not narrowly tailored to advance a
city interest."8
337 Id. at 1037. The court even noted that sankirlan can be more aggressive and intrusive"
than begging, Id.
338 Id. at 1037-38 Mt is the message that is the same, and that message is entitled to First
Amendment protection.") (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,777 (1978)
(source of speech does nut define inherent worth in terms of capacity to inform)).
339 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1038.
340 See id.
341 See id. Synthesizing the O'Brien test and the standard for reasonable regulation of time,
place or manner of expression, the court articulated three requirements for constitutional
regulations. Id. at 1039. First, a regulation must be content-neutral. Id. Second, it must be
supported by substantial governmental interest. Id. Third, the regulation must allow alternative
means of communication. Id. The court addressed the first and third requirements before
addressing the second. See id. at 1039-41.
342 See id. at 1040.
343 Id. Organized charities are subject to a New York licensing scheme. Id. The court also
pointed out that, of all the visual and aural intrusions on individual tranquility along Times
Square, only the beggar is singled out for regulation. Id.
844 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1040.
345 See id.
.546
347 Id, a t 1040-41.
348 See id.
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Next, the court balanced the government's interests underpin-
ning the statute against the beggars' freedom of speech interests."9
The court defined the government's interest as protecting and promot-
ing three factors: the beggars' interests, the specific audience's inter-
ests and the general public's interests,""
The Loper court first determined the beggars' interests in this case
to be the widest possible dissemination of two related messages."' First,
the court noted that the beggars wanted to indicate their specific dire
economic plight and request donations." 2 Second, and more generally,
the court observed that the beggars expressed the underside of current
socio-economic conditions. 35"
The court viewed the audience's interests as having information
readily available to it, being informed about social conditions, not
being defrauded, and having one's personal privacy respected."59 Al-
though it considered begging readily compatible with the first two
interests, the court struggled with the degree to which speech must
bow to privacy concerns."5 Although conceding the importance of
personal privacy, the court noted that exposure to differing messages
was in the audience's best interests even if "in unwelcome forms."'"
The court reasoned that outside the home, individuals sacrifice their
privacy rights to the greater societal interest in permitting the expres-
sion.'" The court then emphasized the degree of control that pedes-
trians possess in determining whether they become an "audience" to
the beggar's plea.'" The court concluded that, although close, the
beggars' interests ultimately outweighed those of the specific audi-
ence.359
Finally, the court explored the general interests of the public in
upholding the public order and preventing fraud.'" The court divided
349
 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1047.
5511 Id. at 1042.
551 See id.
552 Id.
353 Id.
554
 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1042.
355 See id, at 1042-43.
555 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
557 See id. at 1047.
555 Id. at 1045. "He can turn away, shake his head before the expression is uttered, avert his
eyes and refuse to acknowledge the speaker, or he can listen to the message and then decide how
to respond to the speaker's personal appeal." Id.
359 Id.
36° See id. at 1045-47. Sec infra notes 368-371 and accompanying text for a discussion of
prevention of fraud.
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society's interest in the public order into two aspects, the prohibition
of disruptive conduct and the Broken Windows rationale. 361 If intended
to combat disruptive behavior, such as aggressive panhandling or in-
terference with traffic, the court concluded that the statute was over-
broad. 362 According to the Loper court, existing laws already addressed
these problems and laws narrowly targeting undesirable activity would
have been a more effective solution than the blanket ban. 363
Furthermore, the court declined to endorse the Broken Windows
justification for the panhandling ban. 364 The court noted that, even
accepting the theory, beggars themselves do not constitute a threat and
have committed only "the offense of being needy." s65
 The court rea-
soned that this justification merely removes "the messenger of bad
news" from sight. 366 The Loper court rejected the Broken Windows
rationale, asserting that speech should not lose First Amendment pro-
tection simply because society finds it disturbing. 367
The court also dismissed the public's interest in prevention of
fraud as a justification for the ban. 368 The court first reasoned that the
fact that organized charities provide some relief does not abrogate the
beggars' right to take matters into their own hands.' 69 Second, the
vague possibility that the donated alms will not be used for the an-
nounced purposes could not support a blanket ban on panhandling.3"
The court concluded that the city's interests in banning begging failed
to overcome beggars' free speech rights. 37 '
In sum, after concluding that begging deserved First Amendment
protection, the Loper court reasoned that the regulation directly tar-
geted begging's message, and that the total ban eliminated alternative
36' Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1045.
36.2 Id.
363 1d. at 1045, 1046.
564 See id. at 1046.
"Id.
366 Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1046.
fi.7 See id. The court also dismissed the argument that the statute was constitutional because
the police do not enforce ityn the peaceful beggar; this would mean that overly broad discretion
was delegated to the decision maker. Id.
368 Id. at 1046-47. The court noted that this argument has often failed in the context of
charitable solicitation. Id. at 1046.
sag
	 id. at 1047 (noting that available services do not meet the great need presented);
see Williams, supra note 2 ("but (Detroit Salvation Army] Colonel Clarence Harvey says there's
enough food and shelter available right now that the homeless don't need to beg.").
") See Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1047. The general fear seems to be that the money will be spent
on "more self-destructive ends, such as the purchase of tobacco, alcohol or drugs." Id. at 1046.
371 1d. at 1047.
572 Id. at 1037-38, 1040.
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forums.'" Moreover, the court determined that the city's asserted in-
terests were not compelling enough to override beggars' rights."'"
Therefore, the court held that the prohibition of begging on New York
City streets did not withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 374
Thus, courts have treated beggars' First Amendment rights incon-
sistently.'" The Ulmer and Young courts determined that societal inter-
ests in preventing begging outweighed any free speech interests of the
beggar. 376' Conversely, the C. C.B., Blair and Loper courts held that the
First Amendment prohibited obstructing beggars' expressing their
message of life in the underclass.'"
VI. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE TO
ANTI-BEGGING LAWS
A. Sociological Views on Begging
Some commentators advocate anti-begging laws as a means for
reasserting control over our decaying urban environment and halting
the dissolution of our social fabric.'" The Broken Windows theory
contends that low-level disorder, if left unchecked, leads to more seri-
ous crime and the breakdown of the social order.'" The presence of
unfixed broken windows, graffiti or panhandling in a neighborhood
creates the impression that the authorities have lost control."" The
community grows increasingly atomized as people modify their behav-
ior to fit their perceptions."' Many will simply leave or at least avoid
"unsafe" areas."' The theory deems such neighborhoods ripe for crimi-
nal invasion.'" Drug dealers, prostitutes and other criminals will then
enter the scene, believing themselves more secure from police inter-
ference.'" One author describing this phenomenon stated that
373 1d. at 1047.
371 Id, at 1048.
375 See, e.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 984 (1990); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1991); C.C.13. v. Florida, 458 So.2d 47, 48
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Ulmer v. Municipal Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
376 See Young, 903 F.2d at 147; Ulmer, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
377 See Loper, 802 F. Supp, at 1048; Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1329; C.C.B., 458 So.2d at 48.
378 See Righismongering, supra note 6, at 23; Wilson & Kelling, supra note 6, at 35.
"9 Fighting, supra note 6, at 18; 1?ightsmongering, supra note 6, at 23; see also Wilson & Kelling,
supra note 6, at 31-32.
"° Fighting, supra note 6, at 18; Rightsmongering, supra note 6, at 23.
381 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 6, at 32.
382 Id.
3113
384 Id.
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"[w] hen the police were withdrawn from the neighborhoods and the
social workers pulled out of the projects, skid row behavior and a sense
of menace extended outward to include larger and larger portions of
the city."385
The social order rests upon a myriad of small, mundane inter-
changes, scenes and images; when these show signs of disrepair, the
structure of our society risks collapse. 3" These commentators argue
that by enforcing laws against begging, cities can reimpose order on
the sidewalks and in the neighborhoods. 887 By constructing such a
background, these cities are setting the stage for the reversal of urban
deterioration . 388
Other commentators view begging and its relation to the social
fabric radically differendy. 889 These commentators view the vaunted
social structure built upon a myriad of background details as a fragile
illusion, "phantom normalcy," erected as psychological insulation
against the harshness of reality.39° In return for hiding the "pain of
being poor," beggars receive society's tacit "phantom acceptance"—or
at least not its explicit rejection."' The listeners can remain unshaken
in their feelings of physical security as well as their naivete over eco-
nomic reality."'
Begging provides a means for the disenfranchised to break
through the "phantom" wal1. 393 This engagement value of begging
allows beggars to bridge the psychological divide and establish, if only
momentarily, a social bond with an individual in the mainstream."' At
that precise moment, the listener cannot avoid confronting the reality
of poverty in our midst."5
 Theorists contend that these small connec-
385 Fred Siegel, Reclaiming Our Public Spaces, THE CITY JOURNAL, Spring 1992, at 35,37.
396 Siegel, supra note 385, at 35.
[Slsidcwalk contacts are the small change from which a city's wealth of public life
may grow.... The tolerance, the room for great differences among neighbors, arc
possible and normal only when the streets of great cities have built-in equipment
allowing strangers to dwell in peace together on civilized but essentially dignified
and reserved terms.
Siegel, supra note 385, at 35 quoting JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN
CITIES (1961).
387 See Rightsmongering, supra note 6, at 23.
"8 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1989, at 46 (citing examples of instances in which theory has apparently worked).
"9 See fiershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 910.
39° See id. at 912.
391 Id.
392 Id.
3" Id. at 912-913.
394 Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 913.
995 /d. at 912.
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tions between individuals will form the "small change" from which a
society can develop, based not in phantom but human realities."" Not
only does such engagement allow the beggar to assert his or her
humanity and "escape momentarily, [his or] her marginalization," it
also fosters empathy in the listener and appeals to the listener's sense
of social justice. 3" 7 At a minimum, such an engagement reminds those
who would prefer to remain shrouded in the naivete of "phantom
normalcy . . . of the human costs of poverty.""'R Thus, under this view,
begging performs a social function closely linked to the First Amend-
ment itself by exposing the true nature of society, even if a bit un-
seemly. The uncomfortable nature of begging, while making it contro-
versial, is therefore seen as precisely that which makes it deserving of
First Amendment protection.
B. Begging Constitutes Protected Expression
Despite its prominent place in the deterioration of cities, begging
deserves First Amendment protection as expressive activity. An exami-
nation of begging, Supreme Court precedents dealing with charitable
solicitation, and the values underpinning the First Amendment reveals
that begging falls within the First Amendment's intended scope of
expressive freedom. Yet, begging does, sometimes, conflict with the
public order or inconvenience more mundane concerns, such as com-
muting. Focusing too much on the definition of speech risks detracting
from the pursuit of a society committed to expressive freedom, as well
as overlooking the gravity of the community's interests. Evaluating
begging restrictions via a Public Forum analysis enables the courts to
strike a balance between beggars' expressive rights and communitarian
interests. By using a conception of the doctrine such as Justice Ken-
nedy's in ISKCON III, one that focuses on the physical nature and uses
of fora, the courts can best maintain diverse voices while not overlook-
ing general societal interests.""
1. Begging Conveys a Message
An examination of begging reveals that it conveys a powerful
message about the economic underside of our society and, thus should
be protected by the First Amendment. By forcing the listener to con-
3" See id. at 915.
"7 :d. at 914.
"8 See id.
399 See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2716 (1992) (Kerinedy,l, concurring).
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front the reality of poverty, begging does express an unmistakable
message. In dicta, the Young court wrongly applied the Spencestandard,
which defines speech as acts intended to convey a particularized mes-
sage easily discernible by its audience, to determine that begging did
not constitute speech. The message ascertained by the Young court,
"that beggars ... want money," necessarily implies two points. First, the
beggar is poor, which highlights the existence of extreme poverty and
its nature. Second, the beggar believes that he or she can elicit alms
from passers-by for survival, implying social obligations owed by mem-
bers of society to one another. Concededly, the message of begging is
difficult to distill into a short phrase common to all beggars. At the
expense of clear articulation, however, begging conveys its message in
a manner calculated to carry a great degree of empathic force. The
First Amendment aims to promote ideas, not simply words, and does
not discriminate against the "inexpressible emotions" often captured
in art or conduct. 40° Thus, viewed as an expression of poverty and social
responsibility, begging expresses a coherent idea in a powerful manner.
In addition, the beggar's audience can comprehend the message,
the second requirement of the Spence standard. The rationales asserted
by the Transit Authority in Young and the police in Loper, show that
begging is targeted because the audience perceives its message. 40 ' The
Broken Windows thesis advocates eliminating begging because it ex-
poses cracks in the public order, demonstrating that society is not in
full control. This theory warns that allowing this reality to become
widely known will accelerate societal deterioration, exemplified by
urban decay. Therefore, the theory presumes that the general public
perceives the import of begging's message and responds accordingly.
This conclusion is reinforced by indications that the presence of beg-
gars engenders fear and uneasiness in members of the public, such as
the Transit Authority study emphasized in Young. 4°2 The reaction of
passers-by can only be the result of their understanding the message,
complete with its large emotional aspect.
2. Begging is Equivalent to Charitable Solicitation
Furthermore, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between
begging and solicitation by organized charities, which the Supreme
4'Sce supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of First Amendment
values.
4C-H Young v. New York City Transit Audi., 903 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1990); Loper v. New York
City Police Dept, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
44)2 See supra note 276.
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Court held protectable in the Schaumburg trilogy. Absent connotations
from their respective labels, both activities involve in-person solicita-
tion of immediate payment for financial support. No less than charita-
ble solicitation, the act of begging is intertwined with the substantial
speech interests articulated in Schaumburg. Begging communicates
information regarding the speaker's plight and spreads views on how
our society treats its disenfranchised. 4"3 Begging also advocates social
responsibility by communicating that society should support and help
out the downtrodden and less fortunate."' Similarly, the ability of
beggars to continue to speak depends no less on the donation of funds
than does the ability of organized groups such as the Krishna society.
The Schaumburg trilogy also demonstrates that begging cannot be
distinguished on the grounds that the beggars retain the money for
personal use. The Riley Court explicitly noted that the speech of pro-
fessional fundraisers is protected despite the fact that they are being
compensated."'
3. Begging Advances the First Amendment's Values
Extending protection to begging as speech also advances the val-
ues underlying the First Amendment. Each of the theories articulated
by commentators highlights a benefit to society from maximizing the
opportunity to express ideas. Protecting begging expands the oppor-
tunity to a largely disenfranchised class of citizens through nontradi-
tional modes of expression.
In addition, begging advances the Marketplace of Ideas theory by
challenging preconceptions of poverty, especially by shattering care-
fully constructed illusions of "order." Begging also challenges views on
communal responsibility by implicitly advocating a duty to help the
poor and providing an alternative to traditional charities. Whether one
agrees with the beggar's message is irrelevant, for the Marketplace
theory contends that truth will only emerge from open and uninhibi-
ted debate.
Moreover, begging furthers the Democratic Process theory in two
primary ways. First, allowing begging to exist in open sight allows
citizens to realize the full magnitude of socio-economic conditions.
This theory contends that enlightened public policy can only result
when the citizenry enjoys a full understanding of the issues. If begging
403 1-lershkoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 905.
404 id.
415 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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could be swept up and hidden away, then citizens might fall prey to an
illusion of normalcy, and not truly comprehend that there was a serious
public issue at all. Second, begging may be the only means of access,
albeit indirect, to public policy formation left for the poor on the
fringes of society.
Finally, begging also furthers the Self-Realization value of freedom
of speech. So long as it does not cross the line into aggressive "pan-
hassling," begging provides an outlet for beggars to express their opin-
ions and disseminate their values. Even broader than merely a point
of access to public policy, begging links the indigent to the mainstream.
These momentary escapes from marginalization provide the beggar's
only opportunity for expressing his or her "inner spirit." 4°6
Thus, an investigation of begging's message, the Supreme Court's
holdings on charitable solicitation, and the values underlying freedom
of speech, demonstrates that begging fits within the intended scope of
the First Amendment. Although often accompanied by explanations,
opinions or words of various sorts, the totality of begging deserves
protection, not simply incidental conversations as argued by Judge
Meskill in his Young dissent."1 Organized charities convey their mes-
sage, regardless of whether they give a full explanation of the cause to
every potential donor. Likewise, beggars convey their message through
panhandling, and artificial distinctions between those commenting on
President Clinton's tax policies and those simply extending a paper
cup should not be used to delimit First Amendment protection.
C. The Public Forum Doctrine
Beggars' activities nevertheless conflict with other interests of the
community. For example, beggars in the subways do hinder the most
efficient operation of mass transportation and affect congestion. Beg-
ging also contravenes the maintenance of a general sense of order and
safety sought by government authorities. Although the First Amend-
ment has never been costless, the Supreme Court has recognized that
freedom of speech must be balanced against competing interests.
Therefore, the courts' challenge is to develop a standard of review for
begging regulations that will enable them to strike the appropriate
balance.
A heavy focus on what qualifies as speech risks detracting from
the task of devising appropriate balances. While defining protectable
4116 Herslikoff & Cohen, supra note 41, at 903.
907 Young, 903 F.2d at 166 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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speech serves a necessary threshold function, the preferred position
of expressive freedom suggests a broad scope of protected expression.
The First Amendment's underpinning theories all emphasize the bene-
fits from maximizing the pool of potential speakers and ideas. An
approach that merely stops with a determination of "speech," and
accords absolute protection, is inadequate. First, such an approach
forces the courts to make final decisions on which voices will be heard
and creates a substantial risk of narrowing the range of speech to
exclude the less mainstream voices. Second, such an approach ignores
the infinite variety of ideas and methods of transmission. Some expres-
sive acts may simply impose too high a cost on the rest of society, while
the same conduct or message in a different form, may be perfectly
compatible when placed in different surroundings. The courts should
make an initial determination that a message is probably conveyed,
within broad parameters, and then focus on accommodating the mul-
tiplicity of voices and interests.
Begging exemplifies a form of expression that wreaks havoc with
First Amendment analysis. By mixing conduct and speech into an
inseparable mass of expression, begging operates interactively with
society and therefore inevitably comes into conflict with competing
forces, such as traffic. In addition, begging's association in many peo-
ple's minds with the uglier side of life engenders strong reactions
against both the message and the messenger. Any analytical approach
to begging restrictions must possess two important qualities. First, the
doctrine must be flexible enough to reconcile the inevitable conflicts
with other societal goals. Second, the doctrine must be able to with-
stand the tide of popular repulsion, to protect begging when necessary.
The Public Forum doctrine provides a ready framework to deal
with forms of expression like begging. First, it aims at developing a sort
of New Roberts Rules of Order, for accommodating as much speech
as possible without frustrating the forum's primary purpose.'" Second,
using Justice Kennedy's view of the doctrine, which places heavier
emphasis on objective criteria, would insulate the analysis somewhat
from the effect of popular reaction that can easily influence the gov-
ernment's rules and asserted interests.'" The courts should focus on
the three factors articulated by Justice Kennedy in his ISKCON concur-
rence when evaluating begging restrictions: the property's shared
physical similarities with traditional public fora, whether the govern-
ment has permitted broad public access to the property and whether
4°8 K2.1ven, supra note 41, at 13.
°9 See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2716 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring),
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expressive activity would interfere in a significant way with the uses of
the property. 410
The Loper and Blair courts correctly struck down anti-begging
ordinances because they operated in areas that were clearly public fora.
City streets have been described as quintessential public fora, that
"time out of mind" have been used for the purpose of expression.'"
History alone, however, should not be dispositive. The Supreme Court
has indicated that, in spite of tradition, sidewalks are not always public
fora.'" Thus, certain areas may present examples of fora where beg-
gars' speech rights can justifiably be limited; for instance, a narrow
choke point or within thirty feet of an automatic teller machine. The
Young court, however, disregarded the possibility that new fora develop
to replace old gathering places for citizens. If free speech coexisted
with mass transportation at train and bus terminals in earlier times,
then the two can likely coexist in modern subway stations.
V. CONCLUSION
Restrictions on beggars' free speech rights can best be reviewed
under the Public Forum doctrine. Begging should be considered an
exercise of free speech because it fits within the intended scope of the
First Amendment and is analogous to charitable solicitation. Moreover,
protecting begging advances the First Amendment's underlying values.
The nature of begging, however, creates an unavoidable risk of conflict
with other elements of society. Yet, the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech has never been costless, and begging should be pro-
tected from regulation as much as possible. The Public Forum doctrine
serves this purpose by explicitly varying the degree of scrutiny for
restrictions with the surrounding context, and by making its determi-
nation of forum status on the basis of objective criteria. Therefore, the
Public Forum doctrine provides the analytical approach best suited to
dealing with ambiguous forms of expression such as begging.
JOHN T. HAGGERTY
410 Id. at 2718 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
411
	 v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
412 See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. CL 3115, 3120 (1990) (sidewalk running only from
parking lot to U.S. Post Office).
